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ADMINISTRATIVE COURT OF TOULOUSE 
SECOND CHAMBER 
PETITION NUMBER 0104248 
 
Mr. S. LIPIETZ et al. v. the Prefect of the 
Haute-Garonne Department and the SNCF  
 
ADVISORY OPINION BY: 
 JEAN-CHRISTOPHE TRUILHÉ, GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER
†
 
May 16, 2006 Hearing 
June 6, 2006 Reading 
_______________________ 
 
 
The October 4, 1940 ―law‖1 on ―foreign nationals of the Jewish 
race,‖ was applicable until the August 9, 1944 executive order, 
concerning the restoration of republican legality on the French 
 
 Translator‘s note: the SNCF, an acronym for ―Société nationale des chemins 
de fer,‖ is the French National Railway Company. 
† For an explanation of the now-extinct position of Government Commissioner 
or commissaire du gouvernement, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Recent French 
Legal Developments Concerning a War-Time Arrest and Imprisonment Case, 25 
MD. J. INT‘L L. 264, 265 n.3 (2010). 
1. Translator‘s note: the expression, acte dit loi, was used in the original French 
document to refer to laws enacted during the Vichy régime but which were later 
rendered void by the August 9, 1944 Order restoring republican legality. (VGC). 
The French expression connotes a governmental action that pretends to be law 
without in fact being so and has been used by others to express the idea that 
Vichy‘s so-called laws were not law. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE REMY, LES LOIS DE 
VICHY: ACTES DITS ―LOIS‖ DE L‘AUTORITE DE FAIT SE PRETENDANT 
«GOUVERNEMENT DE L‘ÉTAT FRANÇAIS» (1992). 
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mainland, went into effect. Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 ―law‖ 
provided that ―foreign nationals of the Jewish race may, from the date 
of the currently promulgated law, be interned in special camps by 
decision of the prefect of the ―département‖2 in which they reside.‖ 
The implementation of these provisions was to be combined, in 
particular, with those provisions found in the July 22, 1940 ―law‖ 
regarding the review of naturalizations (those which had occurred 
pursuant to the law of August 10, 1927)3 as well as the October 3, 
1940 and June 2, 1941 ―laws‖ on the status of Jews.4 
The August 9, 1944 order of the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic regarding the restoration of republican legality on 
the mainland, after providing in Article 1 that ―the Republic . . . by 
law . . . did not cease to exist‖ provides in Article 2 that ―all 
legislative acts . . . and the orders issued in implementation thereof on 
the continental territory after June 16, 1940, and until the 
establishment of the Provisional Government of the French Republic 
[in 1944] are null and void and of no effect,‖ but ―this nullity must be 
expressly specified.‖5 The order further provides in Article 3 that ―the 
following acts are hereby declared to be null and void: . . . all those 
laws establishing any discrimination whatsoever on the basis of an 
individual‘s status as a Jew . . . .‖  
In this case, Mr. Georges Lipietz, age twenty-one at the time, his 
half-brother, Mr. Guidéon S., age fifteen at the time, their mother, 
Mrs. Stéphanie O.-H., Mrs. S., age fifty at the time, and her second 
husband, father of Mr. Guidéon S., Mr. Jacques S., age forty-two, 
were arrested by the Gestapo on the morning of May 8, 1944 at Pau 
on the basis of their real or assumed Jewish origins. It is important to 
note that Mr. and Mrs. S., of Polish origin, had acquired French 
citizenship prior to the July 22, 1940 ―law,‖ on the basis of the 
 
2. A département is a territorial and administrative division. (VGC). 
3. This law had facilitated the naturalization process. See Rémi Rouquette, The 
French Administrative Court’s Rulings on Compensation Claims Brought by 
Jewish Survivors of World War II, 25 MD. J. INT‘L. L. 304, 307 n.5 (2010). (VGC). 
4. Both of these laws defined who was to be deemed a Jew and limited the 
professions which Jews were entitled to exercise. The second of these laws, harsher 
than the first, replaced the first. For the text of the laws and commentary on them, 
see REMY, supra note 1, at 87–91, 116–27. (VGC). 
5. It had to be expressly specified in post-war legislation nullifying exactly 
which statutes and regulations of Vichy were to be revoked because the Vichy 
regime had carried on normal governmental functions and enacted innumerable 
laws and regulations that did not need to be revoked. (VGC). 
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August 10, 1927 law.6  
On the afternoon of May 8, 1944, under the supervision of German 
soldiers, the parties were transferred to Toulouse where they then 
were turned over to the Haute-Garonne administration.  
Mr. Lipietz and the S. family members then were subjected to 
administrative detainment in the premises of the penal administration 
until the morning of May 10, 1944 on the decision of the services of 
the Haute-Garonne administration and based on the aforementioned 
provisions of Article 1 of the ― law‖ of October 4, 1940.  
On the morning of May 10, 1944, again on the decision of the 
services of the Haute-Garonne administrative services, they were 
turned over to the SNCF with the goal of transporting them to the 
Paris-Austerlitz train station. Their transportation from the Haute-
Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz took place via cattle car, which was 
ventilated by a single opening and contained fifty-two people. The 
journey, which did not end until the evening of May 11, 1944, lasted 
more than thirty hours, during which time they received water only 
once, at the Red Cross‘s initiative at the Limoges train station. 
On the evening of May 11, 1944, the Societé de Transport en 
Commun de la Région Parisienne (STCRP)7 transported them in 
buses from the Paris-Austerlitz train station to the Drancy internment 
camp. 
From May 11, 1944 to the evening of August 17, 1944, Mr. Lipietz 
and the S. family were interned at the Drancy camp, which was run 
by the German Occupation authorities yet guarded by French police. 
There, they were classified as ―deportable persons.‖ However, the 
advancement of the allied troops towards the Parisian region 
ultimately saved them from deportation. Nonetheless, on August 17, 
1944, after the Germans had departed, the French guards continued to 
enforce the internment measures until the Swedish Consul, Raoul 
Nordling, intervened that same day, leading to the camp‘s liberation.  
* 
Through two prior claims to the Administration of the Haute-
Garonne and the regional director of the SNCF Midi-Pyrénées 
respectively on September 6, 2001, Mr. Georges Lipietz and Mr. 
 
6. See supra note 5. (VGC). 
7. Translator‘s note: the STCRP is the Parisian Regional Transit Company. 
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Guidéon S. sought joint and several liability from the State and from 
the SNCF for alleged wrongful acts committed by the services of the 
Haute-Garonne administration and the railway company. 
Mr. Lipietz sought damages for the emotional harm and difficulties 
to which he and his mother were subjected—in the amount of € 
100,000 for himself and € 50,000 for the successors in interest of his 
mother, sharing the damages with his brother, Mr. Guidéon S., for a 
total compensation of € 150,000. 
Mr. S. sought damages for emotional harm and difficulties to 
which he and his parents were subjected—in the amount of € 100,000 
for himself, € 100,000 for the successors in interest of his father, and 
€ 50,000 for the successors in interest of his mother, sharing the 
damages with his brother, Mr. Georges Lipietz, for a total 
compensation of € 250,000. 
Both prior compensation requests were rejected implicitly by the 
Services of the Haute-Garonne and expressly by the legal director of 
the SNCF on October 5, 2001. 
In their complaint filed on November 14, 2001, Mr. Lipietz and 
Mr. S. request this Court to grant judgment jointly and severally 
against the State and the SNCF and order them to pay € 150,000 and 
€ 250,000 respectively for the aforementioned damages. 
The successors of Mr. Georges Lipietz, who passed away in the 
course of the proceedings, are as follows: his widow, Mrs. Colette 
Lipietz, and his children, Mr. Alain Lipietz, Mrs. Catherine Lipietz-
Ott, and Mrs. Hélène Lipietz.  
In the latest of their submissions, Messrs. Guidéon S. and the 
Lipietz parties also request that this Court add the interest that has 
accrued to the damages requested since the date of receipt of the two 
prior claims on September 6, 2001 and that such interest be 
capitalized annually. 
In a memorandum of law filed on May 8, 2006, the plaintiffs also 
ask this Court: first, to void the two decisions dated April 24, 2006, 
by which the Secretary of Defense invoked the four-year statute of 
limitations against Mr. Georges Lipietz and Mr. Guidéon S., and 
second, to find the government liable to pay to each of Mr. George 
Lipietz‘s successors in interest the sum of € 1 in redress for the moral 
wrongs they suffered due to their deceased spouse and father‘s 
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having received notice of the unfavorable decision against him. 
Finally, the petitioners further request that this Court require the 
State and the SNCF to jointly pay € 6,000 to Mr. Guidéon S. and € 
1,500 to each of the Lipietz petitioners, pursuant to Article L. 761-1 
of the CJA.8 
* 
The administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF request that 
the claims be dismissed. 
Concerning the government‘s defense in this case, it should be 
emphasized that, under the provisions of Article R. 431-10 of the 
CJA, the defense lies solely with the administrator of the Haute-
Garonne, since it is undisputed that the litigation ―arose from the 
government‘s civil administration activities in the aforementioned 
département.‖9 The Secretary of Defense would be unable effectively 
to invoke the provisions of Article R. 431-9 of the same Code to 
demonstrate his status as ―relevant minister‖ within the meaning of 
that article, since Article R. 431-9 of the CJA is only relevant 
―subject to the provisions of Article R. 431-10‖ of the same Code. As 
for the decision resulting from the October 23, 2003 inter-ministerial 
meeting—the summary of which was provided to you by the Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Planning10—declaring that the government 
would be represented and defended by the Secretary of Defense in 
the event of any claims for damages based on the enforcement of 
anti-Semitic legislation by the government of the so-called French 
State,11 this decision is devoid of any normative character. 
Following a formal notice to present his defense, addresses on 
March 13, 2006 by the president of the Second Chamber of this Court 
and pursuant to Article R. 612-3 of the CJA, the administrator of the 
Haute-Garonne nevertheless produced a seven-line memorandum on 
March 28, 2006, by which he incorporated, as an alternative, the 
submissions of the Secretary of Defense.  
 
8. Translator‘s note: CJA means the Code of Administrative Justice. 
9. See supra note 2. (VGC). 
10. Translator‘s note: Ministre de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire. 
11. The reference here to the ―French State‖ is to the ‗Etat français, the name 
Vichy gave itself to distinguish itself from the Républiques françaises, the 
republican form of government that had been France‘s form of government since 
the time of the French Revolution except for its short spurts of empire and renewal 
of Bourbon monarchy. (VGC). 
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* 
In light of the extreme gravity of the events, the advisory opinion 
that we shall present is based on references to case law that may seem 
abstract to the victims of the events in question and to their family 
members who have not been formally trained in public law; we 
apologize in advance to the parties involved. 
In another sense, we are forced to apply legal reasoning devoid of 
any complacency regarding the past actions of the Haute-Garonne 
administrator and of the SNCF, or of the administrative judge. It 
should be clear, as Robert Paxton observed in the conclusion of his 
work, La France de Vichy, 1940–1944, quoted by Jean Massot in the 
Revue administrative, that we are incapable of knowing what we 
would have done under the same circumstances. In another vein, in a 
conversation reported by Josy Eisenberg, Adin Steinsaltz remarked 
that, despite considerable progress made since biblical times and 
regardless of the various circumstances and customs of the times, 
humanity has never succeeded in inventing new sins. 
The subject matter jurisdiction of this Court to rule on the 
government‘s noncontractual liability in the case at hand is not 
contested by any party to the litigation. Indeed, whatever the gravity 
of the infringement to individual freedoms that the measures taken by 
the authorities of the Haute-Garonne caused to Mr. Georges Lipietz 
and the S. family, these measures are based on the aforementioned 
provisions of Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 ―law,‖12 and therefore 
it cannot be said that they may not be linked to the enforcement of a 
legislative text or regulation within the meaning of the Jurisdictional 
Court‘s13 case law on the definition of voie de fait:14 On that topic, see 
the TC,15 June 20, 1994, Madaci and Youbi case (advisory opinion by 
 
12. Pursuant to this law, foreign Jews could be assigned forced residences and 
interned in special camps. For the text of the law and commentary, see REMY, 
supra note 1, at 91–92. (VGC). 
13. Translator‘s note: the Jurisdictional Court is known as the Tribunal des 
conflits (“TC”). 
14. Translator‘s note: under French administrative law, the voie de fait, which 
does not appear to have an American English legal equivalent, is an egregious 
illegal act by the administration constituting an assault on an individual‘s personal 
liberty or property rights. When an act falls under the definition of voie de fait, 
French administrative law considers the administrative nature of the act to be lost. 
Therefore, that act can no longer be an administrative act subject to the 
administrative law judge‘s jurisdiction but has to be subject to a civil jurisdiction.  
15. See supra note 13. (VGC). 
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Abraham) on the absence of voie de fait in the enforcement of a 
deportation order that may have violated the provisions of the 
ECtHR. Concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to rule on possible 
misconduct committed by the civil administrations of the government 
due to the application of anti-Semitic legislation of the so-called 
French State,16 and regardless of the gravity of the attack against 
individual liberty, see also implicitly the CE,17 April 12, 2002, Papon 
case (advisory opinion by Sophie Boissard). 
More delicate is the issue of this Court‘s jurisdiction over a 
noncontractual liability action brought against the SNCF. The rail 
company asserts lack of jurisdiction as its principal defense. 
It is clear that, at the time of the facts in dispute, the SNCF was 
governed by the agreement of August 31, 1937 which had been 
approved by executive decree of the same date and by the October 
10, 1943 ―law‖ that served to reorganize the SNCF‘s board of 
directors, under the terms of which the SNCF—notwithstanding the 
fact that the government owned the majority of its capital and half of 
the seats on its board—became a limited liability company, subject to 
certain exemptions from the common law, thus as a corporation 
under private law. It is also worth noting that, in a similar 
noncontractual liability action brought against the SNCF by Mr. 
Schaechter, whose parents had also been transported by the railway 
company from the Haute-Garonne for purposes of deportation, the 
Paris Court of First Instance, in a judgment dated May 14, 2003, and 
the Paris Court of Appeals, in a judgment dated June 8, 2004, 
implicitly deemed themselves to have jurisdiction over the case. 
The criteria under which this Court recognizes its jurisdiction over 
a noncontractual liability action against a private individual were 
specified by the CE in the March 23, 1983 case of SA Bureau Veritas 
(advisory opinion by Denoix de Saint-Marc), concerning harm 
attributed to a limited company active in the governmental service 
administration of aviation safety. These criteria are three-fold: first, 
the institution of private law must participate in the ―delivery of 
government service; second, to this end, the institution of private law 
must be vested with governmental power prerogatives; and finally, 
the harm for which compensation is sought must have been caused 
 
16. See supra note 11. (VGC). 
17. Translator‘s note: CE stands for Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative 
law court in France. 
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―in conduct within the scope of government power prerogatives 
conferred to it for the enforcement of the government service 
mission‖ with which it is vested. 
In the case at hand, as regards the criteria of participation in the 
fulfillment of a mission of administrative government service, even if 
it is clear that the SNCF had preserved as its principal activity at the 
time of the facts in dispute the provision of industrial and commercial 
passenger transport by rail, it is nevertheless also clear that the 
individuals interned on racial grounds, who were transported by the 
railway company from the internment premises of the so-called free 
zone18 to the Drancy camp, were not traveling as passengers of this 
commercial and industrial government service, since they were 
transported against their will. It is also clear from the pretrial judicial 
investigation, particularly the report entitled La SNCF sous 
l’occupation allemande, 1940–1944,19 written at the request of the 
SNCF by Christian Bachelier, a researcher at the CNRS,20 and made 
public in September 1996, that the transportation of individuals 
interned on racial grounds was not organized by the German 
Occupation authorities, who either would have reserved train cars on 
pre-existing convoys or commandeered them from the national 
company; rather, it was organized by the SNCF under orders given 
by the administrative services of the Ministry of the Interior of the so-
called French State.21 The above-referenced transfers were subject to 
a specific SNCF accounting system designated as either ―Ministry of 
the Interior transfers‖ or ―transfers of Hebrews,‖ and billed to the 
Ministry of the Interior, each bill specifying the administrative 
division that had requested the transport.  
Under these conditions, having transported Mr. Lipietz and the S. 
family, along with tens of thousands of other individuals interned on 
racial grounds, from the Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz, it appears 
 
18. The ―free zone‖ is another way of referring to the part of France that 
originally was not occupied by the German military. After invading the north of 
France in June 1940 and France‘s formal capitulation by an armistice on June 22, 
1940, the German army found it more cost-effective to remain in the north. They 
invaded the rest of France in November, 1942, following the Allied landing in 
North Africa. See generally ROBERT O. PAXTON & MICHAEL MARRUS, VICHY 
FRANCE AND THE JEWS (1981). (VGC).  
19. The SNCF under German Occupation, 1940–1944. 
20. Centre national de la recherche scientifique (National Center for Scientific 
Research). 
21. See supra note 11. (VGC). 
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to us that the SNCF must be considered to have executed not an 
industrial and commercial service of transporting passengers but 
rather an administrative government service mission, in the sense that 
the government of the so-called French State22 conceived of the 
notion of government service; namely, the transportation of 
individuals interned on racial grounds with a view to their future 
deportation. 
Having identified the existence of an administrative government 
service mission, the two other criteria for jurisdiction do not present 
much difficulty. The SNCF‘s exercise of governmental power 
prerogatives in carrying out its transportation services can in fact be 
deduced from the ever-present duress that clouded these transports, 
since not only were the parties transported against their will, but they 
also did not want to be transported under the aforementioned 
conditions that were contrary to human dignity. 
Finally, the harms for which the petitioners seek compensation 
from the SNCF are inherent in the exercise of these governmental 
power prerogatives; namely, in the duress that was imposed on them 
or their successors in interest both in being transported to Paris-
Austerlitz for deportation and in having been transported under such 
conditions.  
Given the combination of the execution of an administrative 
government service mission, the exercise of governmental power 
prerogatives and the attribution of the harm to the exercise of these 
prerogatives, the noncontractual liability action brought by Messrs. S. 
and the Lipietz parties against the SNCF, in our view, 
notwithstanding the contrary opinion held by the Paris Court of 
Appeals in the Schaechter case, falls within the purview of the 
subject matter jurisdiction of this Court. This Court will thus reject 
the lack of jurisdiction defense raised by the SNCF.  
The geographical jurisdiction of this Court to hear the present 
action for noncontractual liability has not been disputed by any party 
to this litigation. Indeed, Article R. 312-14 of the CJA provides that 
―liability actions based on a cause of action other than breach of 
contract or quasi-contract and filed against the government . . . or . . . 
private institutions managing a governmental service are subject to: 
1. the jurisdiction of the administrative court when the alleged tort is 
 
22. See supra note 11. (VGC). 
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attributable to a decision . . . , which could have been subject to an 
action for annulment before that court; 2. the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court in the location or where the cause of the injury 
has occurred, where the alleged harm . . . is attributable to . . . a fact 
or an administrative reaction . . . .‖ In this case, on the one hand, 
regarding the injury attributed to the services of the Haute-Garonne 
administration, the administrative internment measure taken against 
Mr. Lipietz and the S. family could have been subject to an action for 
annulment before this Court, if it had existed under its current 
denomination and more importantly if it had possessed its current 
jurisdictional powers at the time of the measure in question; on the 
other hand, regarding the injury attributed to the SNCF, the cause 
originated with the transfer of the parties over to the railway 
company by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne 
administration for transport to Drancy and subsequent deportation. 
* 
 The admissibility of claims for damages made primarily by the 
petitioners does not raise any difficulties. 
First, the litigation is linked to the rejection, whether implicit or 
explicit, of the prior requests made on September 6, 2001 by Messrs. 
Georges Lipietz and Guidéon S. and addressed respectively to the 
administrator of the Haute-Garonne and to the SNCF.  
Second, although it is undisputed that Mrs. Stéphanie S., mother of 
the two petitioners, and Mr. Jacques S., father of Mr. Guidéon S., 
died prior to the commencement of this action for damages, Mr. and 
Mrs. Jacques and Stéphanie S.‘ potential right to compensation began 
upon the occurrence of the facts that could have proximately caused 
the harm and before their death created patrimony rights in their 
respective successors in interest: see in this regard CE March 29, 
2000, Assistance Publique – Hôpitaux de Paris, No. 195662 
(advisory opinion by Chauvaux). The potential right to compensation 
of Mr. Georges Lipietz, who died during the proceedings, was also 
transmitted to his successors in interest.  
  The memorandum of law presented on May 8, 2006 by Messrs. S. 
and Lipietz et al. presents a different pleading than the above.  
Indeed, with respect first to the arguments for voiding the two 
decisions of the Secretary of Defense dated April 24, 2006 that 
involved the four-year period for extinguishing claims, the latter 
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constitute, despite the petitioners‘ arguments to the contrary, opinions 
about abuse of power : see the CE May 2, 1973 Sieur Guyot case 
(advisory opinion by Gentot) that revisited the case law derived from 
the CE Maigret judgment of May 26, 1937 and which was recently 
confirmed by the CE June 25, 2004 Feind case (advisory opinion by 
Piveteau). Certainly, when the arguments for voiding a decision that 
applied the four-year claim extinction or limitations period are 
combined in the same claim, with the primary argument being for 
damages, the CE finds it is a proper administration of justice that the 
litigation against the statute of limitations defense be examined as 
part of the main case: see in this respect the Piveteau opinion in the 
aforementioned June 25, 2004 CE Feind case. But, in the present 
case, not only were the findings regarding the abuse of power in the 
decisions of April 24, 2006 not addressed in the initial petition, 
recorded November 14, 2001, but they also were not introduced in a 
separate petition that this Court could have, if time permitted, joined 
with the first, notwithstanding the rules of geographical jurisdiction, 
given its connection within the meaning of Article R. 342-1 of the 
CJA. Presented in reverse order in a later supplementary 
memorandum, dated November 14, 2001, these arguments take on 
the appearance of new arguments.  
Second, the claims for damages made in the same memorandum 
also take on the characteristics of new claims, since the legal theory 
on which compensation is sought, namely the nonpecuniary harm 
allegedly committed against the successors in interest to Georges 
Lipietz by the notification of a decision applying the four-year statute 
of limitations against their deceased husband and father is separate 
from the principal legal theory of injury on which compensation is 
claimed. Furthermore, it does not appear that a prior request23 
preceded this petition for compensation. 
We therefore can only conclude that a denial is in order for the 
latter claims on the basis of their inadmissibility. 
 * 
Regarding the merits of the action for damages brought by the 
petitioners, the administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF 
 
23. Such a prior request, in the form of a letter written to the alleged wrongdoer, 
is required in certain situations before a claim may be brought in an administrative 
court. (VGC). 
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both enter a defense based on the expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  
This, in our opinion, is the most delicate issue of the litigation. 
This Court in effect will have two sets of issues to decide 
successively; namely, first, the identification of the applicable statute 
of limitations with respect to both the petitioners‘ claim against the 
government and against the SNCF, and secondly, once this has been 
identified, this Court must determine the point at which said 
limitation period started to run with respect to both the government 
and the SNCF.  
Regarding the applicable statute of limitations, the administrator of 
the Haute-Garonne, who, as has been stated, adopts the written 
arguments of the Secretary of Defense, intends to rely primarily on 
the four-year statute of limitations provided by Article 9 of the 
amended January 29, 1831 law regarding . . . the expiration of the 
rights of creditors of the government and, in the alternative, shall rely 
on the ten-year statute of limitation mentioned in Article 2270-1 of 
the Civil Code. For its part, the SNCF relies primarily on the four-
year statute of limitation provided by Article 1 of law No. 68-1250 of 
December 31, 1968 on the limitation of claims against the national 
government, the départements,24 the communes,25 and public 
institutions and, in the alternative, relies on the aforementioned ten-
year statute of limitations in Article 2270-1 of the Civil Code.  
Mr. S. and the Lipietz parties dispute the applicability of all of 
these statutes of limitation on the grounds that their liability action is 
not amenable to any limitations period under the provisions of the 
single article of law No. 64-1326 of December 26, 1964, which 
establishes that crimes against humanity are beyond the reach of any 
statute of limitations and according to which ―crimes against 
humanity, as defined by the UN resolution of February 13, 1946, 
noting the definition of crimes against humanity as it appears in the 
Charter of the International Tribunal of August 8, 1945, are 
imprescriptible by their nature.‖ The plaintiffs, who maintain that the 
wrongs attributed to the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne 
 
24. See supra note 2. (VGC). 
25. A commune is the smallest French division of administration which has the 
dual attributes of being a local collectivity and a national administrative area. See 
generally GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 184, 292 (3d ed., 2009); REMI 
ROUQUETTE, DICTIONNAIRE DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 160 (2002). (VGC). 
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Prefecture and the SNCF should be classified as crimes against 
humanity or as complicity in crimes against humanity, rely in this 
regard on the advisory opinion by Stéphane Austry in the Pelletier 
case in the CE dated April 6, 2001, according to which ―the 
jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on 
the imprescriptibility of the civil suit for damages resulting from 
crimes against humanity . . . necessarily (would extend to) suits 
aimed at triggering the government‘s liability for such damages, 
whether liability is sought before a judge of the judicial branch or 
through an administrative proceeding.‖  
It should be noted that this interpretation of the Criminal Chamber 
of the Court of Cassation‘s decisions was contested by Sophie 
Boissard in her advisory opinion in the Papon case, CE, dated April 
5, 2002, above.  
In order to settle the debate, it is appropriate to refer to those 
decisions. Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that 
―the civil action is subject to limitations periods as stipulated by the 
rules of the Civil Code. In any event, such an action no longer can be 
brought before the criminal court after the expiration of the statute of 
limitations applicable to the public law [i.e., criminal law] 
action . . . .‖ On the basis of these provisions, the Criminal Chamber 
of the Court of Cassation held in the Touvier case dated June 1, 1995 
that ―when brought before the criminal court, a civil action finds 
itself, based on Article 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, bound 
by the same statute of limitations as would apply in a criminal suit 
(and) that, therefore, the absence of any statute of limitations for 
crimes against humanity applies both to the criminal and civil actions 
that may result from such crimes.‖26  
As the SNCF argues in its defense, it appears clear to us from the 
terms of the above judgment that it is only in the event that a civil 
action is brought before a criminal court, by way of a civil party, that 
such an action [i.e., for a crime against humanity] is imprescriptible. 
Moreover, it cannot be otherwise without overstepping the authority 
of this Court‘s jurisdiction, since it is not for this Court , any more 
than for the civil law courts, to decide whether the actions of the 
administrator of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF potentially 
 
26. Civil actions generally are brought in France as part of criminal prosecutions 
under a procedure in which the victim is constituted as a ―civil party‖ in the 
criminal action (partie civile). (VGC). 
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constituted a crime against humanity or complicity in crimes against 
humanity against Mr. Georges Lipietz and the S. family.  
As for the actions brought before courts having different 
jurisdictions, the plaintiffs cannot successfully argue, in our view, 
that the enactment by the legislature of distinct statutes of limitations 
before the criminal court and before the administrative judge 
disregards the provisions of Article 6, Sections 1 and 14 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  
Therefore, Mr. . S. and the Lipietz parties do not appear to us to be 
entitled to argue that their action for liability would lie beyond the 
reach of any statute of limitations.  
 * 
The basis for imprescriptibility having been rejected, what remains 
is to define the statute of limitations applicable to this litigation.  
Regarding the claim of the petitioners against the government, 
Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides in its original wording based 
on the March 15, 1804 law, which remains in force to this day, that 
the ―government . . . (is) subject to the same limitations periods as 
private individuals and also (may) invoke them.‖ 
Nevertheless, Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law cited above 
provides, in the form adopted based on Article 1 of the executive 
decree of October 30, 1935 concerning the extension of the four-year 
statute of limitations loss of rights defense to the départements27 and 
communes,28 effective until December 31, 1945, that ―lapsed in time 
and definitively extinguished to the benefit of the government . . . 
without prejudice with respect to statutory limitations provided for by 
prior laws are all claims which, not having been paid before the end 
of the fiscal period to which they belong, could not . . . for want of 
sufficient justification have been settled, approved for payment, and 
paid within a period of four years starting from the opening of the 
fiscal year . . . .‖ 
The same Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law provides in its text, 
based on Article 148 of law No. 45-0195 of December 31, 1945, 
setting the general budget (civil services) for the year 1946, effective 
until December 31, 1968, that ―lapsed in time and permanently 
 
27. See supra note 2. (VGC). 
28. See supra note 25. (VGC). 
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extinguished to the benefit of the government . . . without prejudice 
with respect to statutory limitations provided for by prior laws . . . are 
all claims which, not having been paid before the end of the fiscal 
period to which they belong, could not have been settled, approved 
for payment, and paid within a period of four years starting from the 
opening of the fiscal period for creditors domiciled in Europe . . . .‖ 
To implement the aforementioned provisions of Article 9 of the 
January 29, 1831 law in its successive drafts, the minister ordering 
the payment need only invoke the four-year statute of limitations on 
behalf of the government: see in this regard CE, October 11, 1961, 
Ministre des travaux publics et des transports c./ sieur Seveyras 
(advisory opinion by Bernard).  
Article
 
1 of the previously cited law No. 68-1250 of December 31, 
1968, effective from January 1, 1969, provides in its first paragraph 
that ―extinguished due to time-lapse to the benefit of the 
government . . . without prejudice with respect to particular statutory 
limitations mandated by law and without prejudice with respect to the 
provisions of the present law are all claims that have not been paid 
within a period of four years commencing from the first day of the 
year following the year during which the rights were acquired.‖ 
Article 9 of the same law provides that ―the provisions of this law 
shall apply to claims arising prior to the date of its entry into force 
and which have not yet lapsed at that date . . . .‖  
Article 10 of the same law provides that ―all provisions contrary to 
the provisions of this law are repealed, specifically Articles 9 . . . and 
10 of the amended law of January 29, 1831.‖ 
To implement these provisions, Article 2 of executive decree No. 
98-81 of February 11, 1998 . . . regarding the decisions made by the 
government concerning the four-year statute of limitations specifies 
that ―the primary or secondary ordonnateurs29 have the authority to 
invoke the four-year statute of limitations as far as claims against the 
government are related to the expenditures that the ordonnateurs 
have authorized.‖  
In our view, from the above provisions of Article 9 of the January 
29, 1831 law and Article 1 of the December 31, 1968 law, 
 
29. Translator‘s note: in French administrative terms, ordonnateur is used to 
describe the individual authorized to mandate a public expenditure. 
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successively in force, it follows that these laws imposed, with respect 
to claims against the government, a four-year period for the 
extinction of the government‘s debt,30 and subsequently a four-year 
statute of limitations, which explicitly derogates from the principle 
stated in Article 2227 of the Civil Code, whereby the State would be 
subject to the same statutory limitations periods as individuals and is 
absolutely general in scope, except in cases where an explicit 
statutory provision to the contrary applies and provides for a shorter 
or longer statute of limitations: see in this regard with respect to the 
earlier law for the extinction of the government‘s debt,31 CE October 
20, 1943 Sieur Panhard (advisory opinion by Leonard) and CE 
November 29, 1963 URSSAF Loiret (advisory opinion by Chardeau), 
as relates implicitly to the implementation of the four-year lapse 
under Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law; as relates explicitly, see 
CE November 29, 1963, URSSAF du Loiret (advisory opinion by 
Chardeau). 
In the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary, 
the claim that the petitioners assert against the government, based on 
the noncontractual liability of the collectivity with respect to the 
alleged wrongs committed by the administrative services of the 
Haute-Garonne , can be subject only to either the four-year law for 
the extinction of claims against the government under Article 9 of the 
January 29, 1831 law or the four-year limitations period referred to in 
Article 1 of the December 31, 1968 law. 
The applicability of either one these two statutory limitations 
schemes depends, under the above provisions of Article 9 of the 
December 31, 1968 law, on the possible acquisition of the four-year 
time lapse of January 1, 1969, the date on which the December 31, 
1968 law entered into force and, thus, the starting point of the statute 
of limitations that has been chosen for this present litigation. Thus, in 
a noncontractual liability action brought against the government for 
enforcing the ―law‖ of the government of the so-called French State32 
by requiring forced labor on behalf of the enemy, the Administrative 
Court of Nice, in a judgment dated April 4, 2006, Mr. Louis Rouge, 
selected May 1945 as the starting point of the running of the 
 
30. The reference to this period is to the more rigorous limitations law that 
preceded the current one. See déchéance quadriennale in ROUQUETTE, supra note 
25, at 226. (VGC). 
31. See supra note 20. (VGC). 
32. See supra, note 11. (VGC). 
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limitations period and, subsequently, applied only the provisions of 
Article 9 of the January 29, 1831 law, such that, given this starting 
point of the running of the statute of limitations, the four-year lapse 
was attained as of January 1, 1969, according to that jurisdiction.  
In this case, we believe that the statute of limitations defense 
invoked by the administrator of the Haute-Garonne, based primarily 
on the earlier four-year limitations period provided for in the January 
29, 1831 law, should be rectified and examined as it related to both 
the four-year lapse mechanism of the law of 1831 and the four-year 
statute of limitations of the December 31, 1968 law. It should be 
noted, however, that although the administrator of the Haute-Garonne 
has the authority, under the above provisions of Article 2 of the 
executive decree of February 11, 1998 as a secondary ordonnateur33 
of public expenditures, to invoke on behalf of the government the 
four-year limitation period of the 1968 law against a claim based on 
wrongdoing committed by its services, he is not authorized, 
according to the previously analyzed provisions of Article 9 of the 
January 29, 1831 law, to invoke on behalf of the government the 
four-year extinction of debt mechanism under that Article: see in this 
regard the above-cited ruling of the CE, October 11, 1961, Ministre 
des travaux publics et des transports c./ sieur Seveyras. 
* 
Regarding the plaintiffs‘ reparations claim against the SNCF, 
Article 1, Paragraph 2, of law No. 68-1250 of December 31, 1968, 
cited earlier, provides in its second paragraph that ―claims against 
public institutions having a government accountant are limited to the 
same statutory period (four years from the first day of the year 
following that during which the rights were acquired) and under the 
same reservation (of the provisions of this law).‖  
Under the provisions of amended Article 18 of the law No. 82-
1153 of December 30, 1982 regarding national transport, the SNCF is 
endowed with the status of commercial and industrial public 
establishment commencing from January 1, 1983. Nevertheless, 
under the provisions of Article 25 of the same law, the rail industry 
―is subject, in matters of accounting and financial management, to the 
rules applicable to commercial companies,‖ that is to say to the 
accounting rules of private law, and is thus not provided with a public 
 
33. See supra note 29. (VGC).  
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accountant. It ensues from this that, in application the above-cited 
provisions of Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the law of December 31, 
1968, the SNCF is not entitled to invoke in its defense the four-year 
statute of limitations provided by this article.  
On the other hand, Article 2227 of the Civil Code provides that 
―public establishments . . . are subject to the same limitations as 
individuals and may also invoke them.‖ Article 2270-1 of this same 
Code provides that ―noncontractual civil liability actions are barred 
ten years from the manifestation of the harm . . . .‖ 
Finally, Article 2262 of the above-cited Code provides that ―all 
actions, whether in rem or in personam, are limited to thirty years 
before the individual alleging the prescription is obligated to adduce a 
title . . . .‖  
It follows in our view from the combination of the above-cited 
provisions of Articles 2227 and 2270-1 of the Civil Code that the 
reparations claim filed by the plaintiffs against the SNCF, based on 
the noncontractual liability of the company for its acts of misconduct, 
is subject to the ten-year statute of limitations provided in Article 
2270-1, as the thirty-year statute of limitations found in Article 2262 
of the Code has an ancillary nature.  
* 
Having thus defined the applicable statute of limitations for the 
claim of Mr. S. and the LIPIETZ parties, against both the government 
and the SNCF, we now shall determine the point at which the said 
statute of limitations began to run, with respect to both the 
government and the SNCF.  
Regarding the petitioners‘ claim against the government, Article 
10 of the law of January 29, 1831, amended and cited above, 
provides, in the draft derived from Article 2 of the executive decree 
of October 30, 1935 which was in force until December 31, 1968, 
that ―the provisions of the article (9 of the same law that prescribed 
the four-year statute extinguishing claims against the government) are 
not applicable to claims whose order to pay and payment could not 
have been completed within the time limit that was started by the 
administration‘s action . . . .‖ 
Article 3 of the above-cited law No. 68-1250 of December 31 
1968, in force commencing from January 1, 1969, provides that ―the 
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statute of limitations (of four years for claims against the government 
found in Article 1 of the same law) runs neither against the creditor 
who cannot act . . . due to force majeure, nor against anyone who can 
be deemed legitimately in ignorance of the existence of his 
claim . . . .‖ 
The above-cited provisions of Article 3 of the law of December 31 
1968 have, in our view, primarily been aimed at incorporating into 
the law the court-based interpretation of the above-cited provisions 
found in Article 10 of the law of January 29, 1831. Indeed, on the 
basis of these latter provisions, the CE indicated that the four-year 
period for extinguishing claims would not begin to run when a public 
creditor was left in legitimate lack of awareness of a claim by his 
administration: see, in this regard, CE February 14, 1973, Commune 
de Pastricciola (advisory opinion by Boutet). This decision recently 
was confirmed by the CE, based on the provisions of Article 3 of the 
law of December 31, 1968 concerning the four-year statute of 
limitations, in a November 16, 2005 judgment, MM. Auguste et 
commune de Nogent sur Marne (advisory opinion by Didier Casas). 
The notion of legitimate lack of awareness assumes, however, that 
the state of positive law does not allow for the individual who is 
subject to the administration to be aware of the existence of the 
claim, meaning that a simple illegal legislative interpretation by the 
administration would not suffice, at least in terms of the 1968 law, to 
render the individual to be deemed legitimately unaware of the claim: 
see, in this regard, CE May 20, 1994, Gouelo (advisory opinion by 
Mrs. Denis-Linton). 
In this case, the event causing the claim that the plaintiffs are filing 
against the government was the administrative internment measure 
taken on May 8, 1944 by the administration services of the Haute-
Garonne against Mr. Lipietz and the S. family, followed by the 
transfer of the parties to the SNCF by the same services on May 10, 
1944 with the goal of transporting them to the Drancy camp and 
ultimately deporting them. It seems clear to us that, given the 
conditions of their internment, both in the Haute-Garonne from May 
8 to 10, 1944 and in Drancy from May 11 to August 17, 1944, Mr. 
Georges Lipietz and Mr. Guidéon S. were in any event until their 
liberation on August 17, 1944 rendered incapable by an act of the 
administration, within the meaning of Article 10 of the law of 
January 29, 1831, of filing a claim against the government. The ―act 
of the administration,‖ in the preferred meaning of this term, 
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corresponds to the notion of force majeure within the context of 
Article 3 of the law of December 31, 1968. 
The issue of force majeure does not arise, however, except to the 
extent that the state of positive law would have allowed the relevant 
parties to become aware of the existence of their claim against the 
government. Messrs. Lipietz and S. would not, in fact, have been able 
to file effectively a noncontractual liability claim against the 
government for wrongs committed by the administrative services of 
the Haute-Garonne except insofar as the administrative internment 
measure taken against them could have been subject effectively to an 
action for annulment; that is, so that it would have been deemed 
misconduct pursuant to the judicial interpretations of that time period.  
However, nothing seems less likely. 
It is undisputed that the internment measure at issue was taken 
based on the above-cited provisions of Article 1 of the ―law‖ of 
October 4, 1940 on ―foreign nationals of the Jewish race,‖ combined 
with the provisions of the ―law‖ of October 22, 1940 on the review of 
naturalizations34 and of the ―law‖ of June 2, 1941 that replaced the 
―law‖ of October 3, 1940 on the status of Jews.35 
First of all, at the time these provisions were implemented, the CE 
had transposed its Arrighi case law of November 6, 1936, first 
implicitly and then explicitly, via the Vincent judgment of March 22, 
1944 (advisory opinion by Detton), declaring itself unqualified to rule 
on the content of the ―laws‖ of the so-called French State.36 The CE 
made this declaration even though the ―laws‖ emanated from the sole 
executive of the so-called French State, that is to say from a 
governmental body possessing regulatory power, as Professor Julien 
Laferrière highlighted in his work, Nouveau droit public de la France 
(New French Public Law), published in 1941. Thus, Messrs. Lipietz 
and S. would not have been able to challenge effectively before an 
administrative judge the legality of the new legislation applied to 
 
34. The French courts were permitted to denaturalize French citizens who had 
obtained citizenship under the naturalization law of 1927. See Rouquette, supra 
note 3, at 305 n.3. (VGC). 
35. It was the combination of these laws that made foreign-born Jews who were 
French citizens vulnerable to internment in French camps and, ultimately, 
deportation to Nazi concentration and death camps earlier during the war than were 
French-born Jews. (VGC). 
36. See supra, note 11. 
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them by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne until the 
entry into force of the executive order of August 9, 1944 pertaining to 
the reestablishment of republican legality on the continental territory. 
This would apply to ―laws‖ implementing discrimination based on 
having the legal status of being Jewish as well as ―laws‖ establishing 
measures that deprived individuals of their freedom. 
Secondly, the ability for Messrs. Lipietz and S. to challenge 
effectively before an administrative judge the Jewish status imposed 
upon them by the administrative services of the Haute-Garonne prior 
to the entry into force of this same executive order hardly seems any 
more likely. In their written submissions, the plaintiffs have indicated 
that, at the time of their administrative internment, Mr. S. and his 
parents were in possession of false baptismal certificates and Mr. 
Lipietz had not been circumcised. It is undeniable that during this 
time many French or foreign Jews managed to escape deportation by 
using baptismal certificates that were either counterfeit or created 
upon request, which some administrative authorities agreed to accept. 
However, such documents would not have convinced an 
administrative judge. Indeed, while Jewish status was based, pursuant 
both to the provisions of the ―law‖ of October 3, 1940 and those of 
the ―law‖ of June 2, 1941, on the grandparents‘ having been Jewish, 
the CE, through two en banc cases of April 24, 1942 and April 2, 
1943, Sieur Bloch-Favier (advisory opinion by Léonard) and Dame 
Lang (advisory opinion by Lagrange), interpreted these texts in the 
manner least favorable to the interested parties: first, according to 
these decisions, the administrative authority had the right to presume 
an individual to be Jewish based merely on his patronymic name, as 
in the Bloch-Favier case; secondly, this presumption could not 
effectively be rebutted except by affirmative proof to the contrary 
that the grandparents had not been Jewish. The fact that the 
grandparents had been married in an evangelical church would not 
suffice to establish their non-Jewishness in this regard, as in the 
Dame Lang case. Some CE cases did allow that the proof as to non-
Jewishness had been satisfied by petitioners, the government 
commissioner Odent emphasizing along these lines in his advisory 
opinion in the Michelson case of December 31, 1943 that ―a weak 
presumption may be destroyed by an equally weak proof.‖ 
Nevertheless, until the executive order of August 9, 1944 entered into 
force, the criteria laid out in principle by the jurisprudence 
concerning the application of anti-Semitic legislation enacted by the 
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so-called French State did not change: in a comment of the CE Sieur 
Rosengart case of January 12, 1944 (advisory opinion by Chénot), 
the commentator of the Lebon reports, published in 1946, was able to 
note laconically that ―this jurisprudence places a burden of proof on 
the plaintiffs that is often difficult to establish, particularly when it 
concerns the grandparents‘ religion.‖ In light of this jurisprudence, 
we believe that Messrs. Lipietz and S. would not have been able to 
contest effectively in an administrative court the Jewish status that 
had been attributed to them by the administrative services of the 
Haute-Garonne. 
Finally, regarding the legality of the liberty-depriving measure 
taken against the interested parties, the administrative judge‘s control 
over the situation was at the time particularly constrained. In terms of 
outward legality, the CE deemed, in Dame Koch, May 16, 1941 
(advisory opinion by Puget), that an administrative order of 
internment did not have to be explanatory or reasoned, in the absence 
of any legislative or regulatory provision requiring the same. In a 
decision that came after the reestablishment of republican law, Sieur 
Bosquain, on February 19, 1947 (advisory opinion by Barjot), the CE 
in addition specified that the fact that the administrative internment 
order had not been in writing, which seemed to have happened, was 
not an omission that could render the order null and void. In terms of 
internal legality, the CE, in the same Dame Koch case, explicitly 
affirmed by the same Sieur Bosquain case, deemed that ―the 
appropriateness of the measure‖ could not be argued before it in 
litigation, meaning that the CE refused to review possible errors in 
judgment made by the administrative authority. On the same issue of 
internal legality, the CE accepted, in the above-referenced Sieur 
Bosquain case, the legality, based on a theory of exceptional 
circumstances, of an administrative internment order within 
penitentiary facilities, which was also the case in the instant situation. 
In light of such jurisprudence, it does not appear likely to us that a 
possible action for abuse of power begun by Messrs. Lipietz and S. 
regarding the liberty-depriving measure taken against them by the 
administrative services of the Haute-Garonne could have succeeded.  
As a result, in the absence of illegal misconduct capable of being 
imputed to the aforementioned administrative services under the law 
prior to the reestablishment of republican legality, the plaintiffs were 
in legitimate ignorance, in our view, of the existence of any claim 
against the government before the entry into force of the August 9, 
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1944 executive order.  
In terms of such a claim, therefore, and under the above-analyzed 
provisions of Article 10 of the Law of January 29, 1831, the four-year 
statute of limitation did not begin to run until the month of August 
1944. 
It remains to be determined, however, whether the plaintiffs could 
be considered to have remained legitimately unaware of their claim 
against the government following the entry into force of the order of 
the Provisional Government of the French Republic of August 9, 
1944 on the reestablishment of republican legality on the continental 
territory.  
The legal significance of this order is as extensive as it is complex. 
The orders of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, 
although emanating from the government—that is to say from a body 
exercising regulatory power—were given legislative value by the CE: 
see in this regard the Botton case of February 22, 1946 (advisory 
opinion by Detton) regarding an order of the French committee of 
national Liberation that transposed the solution established by the 
aforementioned Vincent judgment of March 22, 1944 for the so-
called laws of the so-called French State.37 The August 9, 1944 order, 
which had long been debated within the judicial bodies of Free 
France, had been drafted by René Cassin, president of the judicial 
committee of Free France and future vice-president of the Conseil 
d‘Etat following the purging of that high body. As explained earlier, 
the executive order affirms, in the first paragraph of Article 2, the 
principle of ab initio nullity of the ―laws‖ of the so-called French 
State but specifies in the second paragraph of the same Article that 
―such nullification must be expressly stated.‖ Although the above-
cited provisions of Article 3 of the order specifically mention, among 
the ―laws‖ for which nullity is expressly stated, ―all those which 
establish or apply any discrimination whatsoever based on being 
Jewish,‖ it follows from the combination of provisions within the 
order that only the special legislation deriving from the so-called 
government of the French State is considered invalid, the remainder 
of the legislative or regulatory acts passed since June 16, 1940 having 
been retroactively validated. The order is, however, not limited to 
operating such a division among acts of the so-called French State‘s 
 
37. See supra note 11. (VGC). 
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government; it affirms not only, in the first sentence of Article 1, that 
―the form of the French government is and remains a republic‖ but 
also, in the second sentence of the same Article, that ―in law, (the 
Republic) has not ceased to exist‖; in the same sense, the political 
regime that the order ends is defined not as the ―previous regime‖ 
but, in Article 7 of the same order, as ―the de facto authority calling 
itself the ‗Government of the French State.‘‖ In our view, the 
normative value, which for a long time  was conferred and then 
recently denied by courts to the provisions found in the second 
sentence of Article 1 of the August 9, 1944 Order,  determined in the 
period following the order the applicable law on the public 
authority‘s liability for the implementation of the special legislation 
of the so-called French State.  
The consequences of the entry into force of the August 9, 1944 
order on the outcome of actions for annulment against individual 
administrative acts based on anti-Semitic legislation of the said 
government were not surprising: in an initial judgment on October 
11, 1944, called Dame Wallerstein (advisory opinion by Odent), the 
CE could only observe a failure to adjudicate. The commentator of 
the Lebon reports nonetheless expressed his regret that the CE had 
confined itself to such a ―simplistic‖ account and had refrained from 
formulating a precedent-setting principle. 
The leading case, following an initial case called Dame 
Chpolansky on November 30, 1945 (advisory opinion by Detton) 
with laconic reasoning, was a judgment of the en banc assembly, 
Ganascia, of June 14, 1946, regarding a compensatory action under 
the presidency of René Cassin (advisory opinion by Odent). Mr. 
Ganascia, a magistrate based in Algeria, sought to hold the 
government liable for several wrongs that had led to his dismissal by 
the Governor General of Algeria in December 1940, on the basis of 
the provisions of the so-called ―law‖ of October 3, 1940 on Jewish 
status. In this case, to which the Sirey reports commentator attributed 
―great theoretical and practical significance,‖ while simultaneously 
formulating ―reservations‖ regarding the solution adopted, the CE 
rejected the petitioner‘s arguments, holding that the individuals to 
which the special legislation—retroactively annulled—had applied, 
had no right to any monetary reparations if the law did not expressly 
provide for any, as the retroactive voiding of the special legislation 
also applied, according to the judge, to the consequences of the harm 
caused by the legislation‘s implementation. Mr. Ganascia thus could 
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not seek any monetary reparations beyond the restoration of the 
salary that he should have received, in conformity with the provisions 
of the order of the Provisional Government of the French Republic 
applicable to his case. 
The rule adopted in the Ganascia decision concerning the harmful 
effects of the implementation of the anti-Semitic legislation of the so-
called the French State38 was affirmed repeatedly in other cases on 
the harmful effects of measures depriving or restricting individual 
freedom based on the special legislation of the same government, 
despite the reservations, even embarrassment, of certain government 
commissioners such as Raymond Odent: see in this regard the Viénot 
case (advisory opinion by Lefas) of April 23, 1947 on an 
administrative internment measure and the Epoux Girard case of 
January 3, 1952 under the presidency of René Cassin (advisory 
opinion by Barbet) on house arrest measures, or the Vincent case of 
February 11, 1959.  
Applying a limited temperament to this jurisprudence has only 
reinforced, in our view, its principal criteria. In the Toprower en banc 
judgment on January 30, 1948, under the presidency of René Cassin 
with dissenting opinion by Célier, the CE effectively recognized the 
right of Mr. Toprower, a Romanian Jew severely crippled following 
his administrative internment in the Gurs camp, to obtain reparations. 
Nevertheless, the CE allowed for governmental liability only after 
noting, in conformity with the arguments of plaintiff‘s counsel, that 
the damages incurred by Mr. Toprower were caused by the ―living 
conditions and ill-treatment to which he [had been] subjected by the 
personnel in charge of security and management‖ of the camp, which 
constituted ―governmental service misconduct separate from the 
implementation of the internment measure taken against‖ the 
claimant. The judicial principle, according to which simply 
implementing special legislation passed by the so-called government 
of the French State would not automatically lead to liability on the 
part of the post-war government, had thus not been challenged by the 
Toprower case. 
It is worth noting that in this case, by contrast, Messrs. Lipietz and 
S. did not raise any issue of excessive behavior on the part of the 
agents of the Haute-Garonne administration; rather, they contest the 
 
38. See supra note 11. (VGC). 
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very legality of the administrative internment measure taken against 
them. We believe that, in the same vein as the above-cited Toprower 
case, the CE implicitly concluded, in the Dame Duez case of 
February 22, 1950 (advisory opinion by Odent), that the fatal 
automobile accident caused by a vehicle belonging to the so-called 
French militia,39 whose act of creation had been retroactively 
invalidated by the August 9, 1944 executive order, constituted 
governmental service misconduct separate from the mission of 
maintaining public order that had been conferred to this group by the 
government of the so-called French State,40 in the sense that the said 
government defined public order. It is worth noting that, in a set of 
different circumstances, the CE held in the Demoiselle Remise case 
(advisory opinion by Guionin) of July 25, 1952 that a gunshot wound 
caused by a member of the so-called French militia did not constitute 
misconduct separate from the mission of this group and thus, in 
conformity with the Ganascia jurisprudence, due to the retroactive 
invalidation by the August 9, 1944 executive order of acts 
establishing special police forces, could not entail government 
liability. 
The Ganascia case law stands for the principle that the retroactive 
invalidity of the special legislation enacted by the so-called French 
State, by means of the executive order of August 9, 1944, signifies 
that the effects of such legislation are not considered not to have 
occurred but rather may not be imputable to the current government. 
We believe that such an analysis has as its only judicial basis the 
provision in the second sentence of Article 1 of the executive order 
according to which ―in law, (the Republic) has not ceased to exist.‖ 
Such a provision, once it is endowed with normative value, signifies 
that the government of the so-called French State, inasmuch as it 
enacted and implemented special legislation, was not acting as a 
continuity of the French government but was merely a de facto 
authority as defined by Article 7 of the same executive order. In the 
past, the CE had followed the same reasoning by holding that the 
government could not be held liable for acts of insurgency of the 
Paris Commune.41 The paradox of the Ganascia jurisprudence is that 
 
39. The reference to a militia is to the milice, a paramilitary organization of 
Vichy France known for its Gestapo-like brutality. (VGC). 
40. See supra note 11. 
41. The Paris Commune was a brief government that arose in 1871 from an 
insurrection after France‘s defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. See generally 
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this reasoning has been applied only to the special legislation of the 
so-called French State, since the government has been held liable for 
all other legislative or regulatory acts passed by the said government, 
retroactively validated by the August 9, 1944 executive order, 
pursuant to common law. As Raymond Odent observed in his work, 
Cours de contentieux administratifs, we are thus dealing with a 
fiction. We must emphasize, however, that this fiction is at the source 
of Free France, of which President Cassin, drafter of the August 9, 
1944 executive order and presiding judge in the Ganascia case, was 
the premier lawyer. In this regard, General de Gaulle remarked, in his 
War Memoirs, that René Cassin ―all by himself a Conseil d‘Etat, 
drafted, seated on a bench in Hyde Park for lack of an office, a 
memorandum of irrefutable and incontestable reasoning on the legal 
nonexistence of the French state and the Vichy government. The 
General would create, on November 16 1940, the legal foundation of 
Free France.‖42  
In any case, this legal fiction constituted the state of positive law 
for more than half a century. Consequently, we believe that, in this 
case, although Messrs. Lipietz and S. cannot be deemed to have been 
unaware of the existence of their claim against ―the de facto 
government which called itself the French State‖ when the August 9, 
1944 executive order entered into force, they were, by contrast, 
legitimately unaware of any claim they had against the post-war 
French government. Therefore, and contrary to the approach adopted 
by the Nice TA in the Louis Rouge case on the application of another 
special legislation by the so-called French State, it is our view that, 
under the above-analyzed provisions of Article 10 of the January 29, 
1831 law, the four-year claim extinction period did not begin to run 
in the present litigation from the month of August 1944 and that the 
four-year statutory period did not begin on January 1, 1969, the date 
of the entry into force of the December 31, 1968 law. It follows from 
this, without needing to rule on the standing of the Haute-Garonne 
administrator to invoke the earlier four-year claim extinction period, 
that said administrator in any event does not seem to us to have a 
legal basis for invoking the provisions of the law of January 29, 1831.  
 
PROSPER-OLIVIER LISSAGARAY, HISTORY OF THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871 
(Eleanor Marx trans., 1976). (VGC). 
42. René Cassin also wrote a passionate booklet on this subject. See RENE 
CASSIN, UN COUP D‘ETAT. LA SOI-DISANT CONSTITUTION DE VICHY (1940). 
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In our opinion, the provision of the August 9, 1944 executive 
order, according to which ―in law, (the Republic) has not ceased to 
exist‖ has been denied normative value only recently. The speech 
given by the President of the Republic on July 16, 1995 during the 
ceremonies commemorating the great round-up of July 16 and 17, 
1942,43 which declared that ―France‖—and no longer merely the de 
facto authority calling itself the government of the French State—‖on 
that day, committed an irreparable act‖ and that it was now time to 
―recognize . . . the errors committed by the government,‖ that these 
words could be considered an invitation to allow positive law to 
evolve.  
Although the August 9, 1944 executive order had not been 
amended by the legislature, the CE implicitly—through its en banc 
judgment in Pelletier of April 6, 2001 (advisory opinion by Stéphane 
Austry), cited earlier—and then explicitly through its en banc 
judgment in Papon of April 12, 2002 (advisory opinion by Boissard), 
also cited earlier, has since denied normative value to the above-
analyzed provisions of Article 1 of the August 9, 1944 executive 
order. In the Pelletier case, the CE indicated that the July 13, 2000 
executive decree establishing reparations measures for orphans 
whose parents had been victims of anti-Semitic persecutions, which 
the claimants challenged, ―did not (change) the conditions under 
which individuals who believed themselves entitled could begin 
liability actions against the government.‖ In the Papon case, the CE 
specified that the provisions of Article 3 of the August 9, 1944 
executive order ―could not have the effect of creating a regime of 
lack of liability of the government for the acts committed by the 
French administration in the implementation of (the anti-Semitic 
legislation of the government of the so-called French State).‖ 
Stéphane Austry‘s advisory opinion in the Pelletier case analyzed the 
provisions of the executive order in the same manner.  
Consequently, we believe that, in the case at hand, Messrs. Lipietz 
and S. could not be legitimately considered to have been aware of the 
existence of their claim against the government within the meaning of 
the above-analyzed provisions of Article 3 of the December 31, 1968 
law before the Pelletier judgment was rendered on April 6, 2001, 
such that the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
 
43. The reference here is to the round-up of Jews known as the rafle du Vel 
d’Hiv, discussed in Rouquette, supra note 3, at 305 n.2. 
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the publication date of that case. We thus deem that, at the time the 
prior letter of request had been submitted by the plaintiffs on 
September 6, 2001 to the administrator of the Haute-Garonne, their 
noncontractual liability claim against the government had not 
violated the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations defense 
invoked by the Haute-Garonne administrator therefore should fail.  
* 
Concerning the plaintiffs‘ claim against the SNCF, the first Civil 
Chamber of the Court of Cassation held in the Dow Chemical France 
case on October 27, 1982 that the ten-year statute of limitations does 
not run, in the case of a noncontractual liability claim, until the day 
on which the claimant ―could truly act,‖ that is to say, possessed 
sufficient information regarding the existence of his claim.  
In this case, it is clear that Messrs. Lipietz and S. were never 
unaware that they had been transported by the SNCF from the Haute-
Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz, from the morning of May 10, 1944 to the 
evening of May 11, 1944. However, the plaintiffs argue that they did 
not learn until recently, thanks specifically to the aforementioned 
report prepared by researcher Christian Bachelier and published in 
September 1996, that the railway transport of individuals who had 
been interned on racial grounds for future deportation had not been 
organized by the German Occupation authorities with requisitioned 
material but rather by the SNCF itself, based on orders placed by the 
administrative services of the government of the so-called French 
State, each transport being included in the accounts and billed by the 
railway industry to the Ministry of the Interior. 
Confronted by these facts, the SNCF has relied merely on the 
Schaechter case of June 8, 2004, also cited earlier, in which the Paris 
Court of Appeals held in a similar case for which it deemed itself to 
have jurisdiction that information sufficient for filing an action for 
noncontractual liability against the rail industry had been made public 
well before the Bachelier report, by several works which it cited and 
had been published between 1946 and 1968. Nevertheless, neither the 
Paris Court of Appeals judgment nor the SNCF itself in its 
submissions to this Court have furnished any evidence of the nature 
of the information provided by these works with respect to the role 
played by the rail industry in the transportation of individuals 
interned on racial grounds for the purpose of deporting them.  
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Under these circumstances, it appears to us to result from the 
investigation phase of this case that sufficient information on the 
existence of the plaintiffs‘ claim against the SNCF had not been 
made accessible to the plaintiffs until September 1996, the date the 
Bachelier report was published. Consequently, at the time that 
Messrs. Lipietz and S. filed their initial request against the regional 
director of the SNCF Midi-Pyrénées on September 6, 2001, the ten-
year statute of limitations provided by Article 2270-1 of the Civil 
Code had not yet expired. The SNCF‘s defense that the statute of 
limitations had expired therefore should fail. 
* 
Regarding the liability of the State and the SNCF for their actions 
against Messrs. Lipietz and S., the administrative internment measure 
taken against the plaintiffs by the administrative services of the 
Haute-Garonne, followed by their transfer by the SNCF from the 
Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz under conditions contrary to 
human dignity, are acts attributable to different authorities which 
were, in addition, not carried out simultaneously. Under these 
circumstances, it is appropriate in our view to clearly identify the 
liability that may arise from the said acts in order to decide, if it is 
justified, that there be separate liability rather than the joint and 
several liability of both authorities as requested by the plaintiffs. 
Regarding the government, the administrative internment measure 
discussed above that was applied against Messrs. Lipietz and S. by 
the Haute-Garonne administrative services, based on the above-cited 
provisions of Article 1 of the October 4, 1940 law on ―foreign 
nationals of the Jewish race,‖ followed by their transfer to the SNCF 
for the purposes of their subsequent transport to the Drancy camp and 
their ultimate deportation, can only constitute a wrongful act or 
omission capable of leading to liability on the part of the government: 
see in this regard the CE Papon case of April 12, 2002, analyzed 
earlier. 
Regarding the SNCF, the rail industry contests its liability on the 
grounds that the Armistice Agreement of June 22, 1940 left it with no 
autonomy. They also argue that, although the Bachelier report notes 
that the orders to transport individuals interned on racial grounds for 
further deportation were given not by the German authorities but 
rather by the administrative service of the Ministry of the Interior of 
the so-called French government, the industry acted in any event on 
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orders. 
A total lack of effective autonomy on the part of the SNCF from 
June 1940 to August 1944 does not, however, seem to us to emerge at 
all from the conclusions of the Bachelier report. On the contrary, the 
industry attempted to resist the demands of the German authorities, 
albeit with varying success, each time it felt that its fundamental 
economic interests were at stake, whether this was with respect to the 
replacement of restaurant cars from Mitropa with those of the 
International Restaurant Car Company or the repair of the railroad 
tracks destroyed due to the continuation of the war between Germany 
and Great Britain. By contrast, when it came to the transports of 
individuals interned on racial grounds for future deportation, the 
SNCF succeeded in imposing, on both the Occupation authorities as 
well as the government of the so-called French State, an initiative to 
label the transports of the internees as ―Hebrew transfers‖ or 
―Ministry of the Interior transfers‖ in view of billing those transports 
to that ministry. However, the idea of these transfers engendered not 
one official protest from the rail industry and not one secret order of 
sabotage. The SNCF‘s independence in the implementation of the 
transports of internees seems to us to be particularly clear given that: 
first, these transfers—although conducted in primitively built cattle 
cars—were being billed to the Ministry of the Interior of the 
government of the so-called French State at the rate of a third-class 
ticket for a seat per person, and secondly—given the discrepancy in 
these invoices—those related to the transfer of individuals interned 
on racial grounds from the Haute-Garonne during 1944 were drawn 
up by the rail industry after the restoration of republican legality and 
addressed to the post-war Ministry of the Interior of the French 
Republican provisional government. Finally, it is worth underscoring 
that the SNCF has never implied that it had been subjected to any 
coercion by the Occupation authorities or by the Ministry of the 
Interior of the government of the so-called French State that would 
have forced the SNCF to transport the individuals detained in the 
inhumane conditions described above. 
In light of the totality of these factors, the transport by the SNCF of 
Messrs. Lipietz and S. from the Haute-Garonne to Paris-Austerlitz for 
further transfer to the Drancy camp and ultimately deportation, under 
the conditions described above, represents in our view misconduct 
and as such renders the SNCF liable. 
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* 
This Court would make a fair assessment of the emotional harm 
and the troubling living conditions that Messrs. Lipietz and S. were 
subjected to by setting the amount of compensation to be allocated at 
€ 15,000 per victim. 
In our view, there is no reason—contrary to the contention of the 
administrator of the Haute-Garonne—to deduct from the amount of 
compensation those payments made to the plaintiffs in 1964 under 
the Ministerial Order of August 14, 1962 that implemented executive 
decree 61-945 of August 24, 1961 (promulgating the July 15, 1960 
agreement between France and Germany regarding compensation for 
French nationals who had been the subject of National-Socialist 
persecution measures). This is because the damages suffered by 
Messrs. Lipietz and S. were not imputable to the German Occupation 
authorities. 
Under these circumstances, the compensation should be set at: € 
37,500 for Mr. Guidéon S., € 15,000 for himself, € 15,000 for his 
father Mr. Jacques S., and € 7,500 for the claim of his mother Mrs. 
Stéphanie S.; and € 22,500 for all of the successors in interest of Mr. 
Georges Lipietz: specifically, € 15,000 for Mr. Georges Lipietz 
himself and € 7,500 for the mother of Mr. Georges Lipietz, Mrs. 
Stéphanie S. 
Given the gravity of the misconduct committed by the 
administrative services of the Haute-Garonne and the SNCF 
respectively, we conclude that two-thirds of the aforementioned sums 
should be borne by the government and one-third should be borne by 
the SNCF. 
The amounts due shall bear interest at the legal rate beginning 
from the day the Haute-Garonne administrator and the SNCF 
received the request for reparations dated September 6, 2001, 
addressed to both parties, the said amounts having been funded on 
September 14, 2002, the date on which the plaintiffs presented their 
request for funding, as well as at each annual renewal following this 
date. 
Finally, given the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to 
order the government and the SNCF to each pay to the plaintiffs the 
sum of € 500 according to the provisions of Article L.761-1 of the 
CJA.  
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For these reasons, we conclude that:  
The government must pay Mr. Guidéon S. and the successors in 
interest of Mr. Georges LIPIETZ the respective sums of € 25,000 and 
€ 15,000, including interest commencing on the day when the 
administrator of Haute-Garonne received the letter of September 6, 
2001 in which the government was requested to grant compensation, 
with accumulated interest as of September 14, 2002 as on each 
annual maturity date, with capitalization at each of these dates to 
continue to yield interest; the SNCF must pay Mr. Guidéon S. and the 
successors in interest of Mr. Georges LIPIETZ the respective sums of 
€ 12,500 and € 7,500, including interest commencing on the day 
when the SNCF received the letter of September 6, 2001 in which it 
was requested to grant compensation, with accumulated interest as of 
September 14, 2002 as on each annual maturity date, with 
capitalization at each of these dates to continue to yield interest; the 
State and the SNCF each pay a lump sum of € 500 to Mr. Guidéon S. 
and to the successors in interest of Mr. Georges Lipietz, pursuant to 
Article L.761-1 of the CJA; and the other claims of the complaint be 
dismissed. 
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